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LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF "TEST-TUBE" BABIES
INTRODUCTION
During the last few years, the lay press of the country has created
widespread interest by publicizing artificial insemination, or as it is
more commonly known, "test-tube" babies. These accounts in the
newspapers and magazines indicate that the process is new and pro-
gressive. However, the ability to impregnate human beings by the
artificial insemination process has been in existence as a laboratory
technique since the middle of the 16th Century.1 The first recorded
successful case of artificial insemination in America was performed
by Dr. J. Marion Sims of South Carolina in 1866, who later aban-
doned the practice because he considered it to be immoral.2  This
radical procedure started a barrage of questions and controversies that
remain unsettled even today.
At least 10,000 children have been born in the United States by
artificial insemination in the last 25 years 3 (some doctors estimate
as many as 40,000).4 It has been estimated that 1,000 to 1,200 babies
are conceived by artificial insemination each year in the United States
as compared with 4,000,000 children normally conceived.5 The artifi-
cial insemination operation is simply and scientifically performed.
However, it is usually necessary to try it several times before concep-
tion is achieved, with the results being successful in about 35 to 50 per
cent of the cases.6
There are two types of artificial insemination in use at the present
time. Artificial insemination which employs the husband's semen
is termed homologous (AlH), and is usually considered as being
legally and morally sound,7 since the child conceived by this method
is the biological product of the husband and wife. This method is
employed when the husband is fertile but impotent, or where the
wife is structually unable to have normal intercourse, but is capable
of giving normal birth.8 The second type of artificial insemination
1. Koerner, AIedicolegal Considerations in Artificial Insemination, 8 LA. L.
Rrv., 487 (1948).
2. Greenhill, J. P., "Artificial Insemination: Its Medicolegal Implications",
Symposium on Medicolegal Problems, J. P. Lippincott Company, p. 45 (1948).
3. Seymour and Koerner, Artificial Insemination, Present Status il the
United States as Shown by a Recent Survey, 116 J. Amer. Med. Ass'n. 2749
(1941).
4. Time, December 27, 1954, p. 52.
5. Lang, Artificial Insemination- Legitimiate or Illegitimate?, McCalls, May
1955, p. 60.
6. Newsweek, December 27, 1954, p. 52.
7. Comment, 30 N. Y. U. L. Rnv. 1016 (1955).
8. 15 Missouni L. Rxv., pp. 154 and 155 (1950).
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in which a donor other than the husband contributes the sperm is
termed heterologous (AID). This technique is employed when the
husband is sterile. In the case of AID the doctors administer semen
from a carefully chosen anonymous donor, who is selected upon a
basis of superior health, intelligence and good family background. In
height, complexion and color of hair and eyes, they are as much like
the sterile husband as possible.9 Genetically, the attempt is to produce
an offspring with hereditary characteristics similar to those of the
husband.
If the semen of the husband is used, the child is obviously legiti-
mate, but where that of a donor is used, general emotional and psy-
chological problems are raised as well as many legal ramifications.
There is a possibility that the husband will reject the child and danger
that the wife might transfer her affection to the one who fathered
her child. However, if the donor's identity is kept a secret, the latter
possibility should be overcome. It is probable that if the child should
discover through some careless remark that he is a "test-tube" baby,
a definite psychological trauma might develop.10
Some of the legal problems raised by the use of AID are the pos-
sible illegitimacy of the child, subsequent speculation on the rights
of inheritance, the husband's right to custody, the legal position of
the administering physician, and possible adultery on the part of the
mother.
ADU.TERY
Adultery is familiarly known in law as the illicit intercourse of two
persons, at least one of whom, is married.11 Whenever the term
adultery is defined, the words sexual intercourse are invariably used
to describe one of the principal characteristics of the offense. Ac-
cording to the ecclesiastical law, intercourse between a man and a
woman of whom one, at least, was lawfully married to a third person
constituted adultery; the ecclesiastical law regarded adultery as a sin
arising out of the marriage relation.12 Adultery has also been defined
as unfaithfulness of a married person to the marriage bed.i3
At common law, adultery was not a crime but it has now been made
a crime by statute in most jurisdictions.14 Although adultery was not
9. See note 6 supra.
10. See note 1 supra, pp. 495 and 496.
11. Hull v. Hull, 2 Strob. 174 (S.C. 1848).
12. Wright, James F., "Legal Aspects of Artificial Insemination", Symposium
on Medicolegal Problems, J. P. Lippincott Company, p. 62 (1948).
13. State v. Hart, 30 N.D. 368,152 N.W. 673 (1915).
14. CoD OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 16-406; MISSISSIPIi CODE, 1942
§ 1998; COnE OF VIRGINIA, 1950 § 18-82; REV. STAT. MAINE, 1954 § 1 of Ch.
134; CODE or GEORGIA, 1953 § 26-5801.
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an indictable offense at common law, it was condemned because of the
possibility of introducing into the family of the husband a false strain
of blood. 15
It has been said that the essence of the offense of adultery consists
in the voluntary surrender of the reproductive system of a married
woman to one other than her husband. 16 However, the fact that it
has been held by some courts that anything short of actual sexual
intercourse does not constitute adultery strengthens the view that it is
not the moral turpitude that is involved, but the invasion of the re-
productive function.
17
The first case in which the problem of heterologous artificial in-
semination was presented in 1921 in the Canadian case of Orford v.
Orford.18 In this case the plaintiff was suing for alimony; and after
finding as a fact that the child born to the plaintiff was the product
of adulterous intercourse rather than artificial insemination as the
plaintiff had claimed, the court declared that "the essence of the of-
fense of adultery consists not in the moral turpitude of the act of
sexual intercourse, but in the voluntary surrender to another person
of the reproductive powers or faculties of the guilty person," and that
therefore AID with or without the consent of the husband was adul-
tery. In this case the insemination was done without the consent of
the husband.
The problem was first dealt with by a court in this country in 1945
in Hoch v. Hoch,'9 where the husband was asking for divorce on the
ground of adultery and alleging that the child born to his wife was
not his. The court found that the wife had insisted upon having a
child and had obtained it through artificial insemination. The court
said, by way of dicta, that AID does not fit any definitions of adul-
tery, and could not therefore support an action for divorce.
A New York court was confronted with the question of the custody
,of a child where the wife had been artificially impregnated with the
-consent of her husband.2 0 The court concluded that the child was
-not illegitimate, but had been at least semi-adopted by the consent of
the husband, and that the father was entitled to visitation rights the
same as those to which an adopting father would be entitled. This
case would seem contrary to the Orford case which declared AID
15. Wright, supra note 12, at 63.
16. Note, 8 FLORIDA L. RmV. p. 308 (1955).
17. See Wright, note 12 supra, p. 65.
18. 49 ONT. L. R. 15, 58 S.L.R. 251 (1921).
19. Cir. Ct. of Cook County, Illinois (1945) ; See Time, February 26, 1945,
p. 58.
20. Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S. 2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
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adulterous. However, it is important to note that in the Orford case,
the insemination was done without the consent of the husband.
Later in R. E. L. v. E. L.,21 which arose on a wife's petition for a
decree of nullity of marriage, the homologous type of artificial in-
semination was presented. The parties had been married in 1942, but
because of the husband's impotency, the marriage was never consum-
mated. The husband received medical treatment but there was no
improvement and the wife then decided to try artificial insemina-
tion with the semen of her husband. The wife had a number of
artificial inseminations during the following year, the last being suc-
cessful. On January 27, 1948, she left her husband permanently but
did not know at the time that she was pregnant; the child was born
in September of 1948. The court granted the wife an annulment even
though the result would be to bastardize the child and held that arti-
ficial insemination of a wife with the husband's semen would not be
sufficient to consummate the marriage. This case was not concerned
with whether or not artificial insemination was legitimate.
The most recent case involving the question of artificial insemina-
tion was a divorce proceeding in which the wife petitioned for the
sole custody of her 5 year old son on the ground that he was con-
ceived by heterologous artificial insemination and that therefore her
husband was not the father. The mother asked the court to rule that
artificial insemination is not contrary to public policy, does not con-
stitute adultery, that the child is legitimate, and that the husband had
no legal interest in the child. Judge Gorman, in an unreported
opinion, stated that the husband had no legal right or interest in the
child, but he also ruled that heterologous artificial insemination, with
or without the consent of the husband, is contrary to good morals
and constitutes adultery on the part of the wife. However, in Judge
Gorman's opinion, homologous artificial insemination is not contrary
to public policy and presents no legal problems.
2 2
EVIDNCm ov LEGITIMACY
There is a presumption of law that a child born during wedlock is
the child of the husband and is legitimate.2 3 However, this fact is
generally only prima facie evidence of the child's legitimacy and it
may be rebutted by proof of such non-access or other fact, which
21. Note, 35 CORNEI.L L. Q. 183, p. 211 (1949) ; Report on an Unofficial Com-
mission Appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1945, S.P.C.K. 1948.
22. Doornbos v. Doornbos, (Super. Ct., Cook County, Illinois, December 13,
1954), Newsweek, December 27, 1954, p. 48; Note 30 N. Y. U. L. REv. 1016,
(1955).
23. Kinnington v. Cato, 68 S.C. 470, 47 S.E. 719 (1904); Tarleton v. Thomp-
son, 125 S.C. 182, 118 S.E. 421 (1923).
1957]
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shows that the husband was not its father.2 4 Even at early common
law the presumption of legitimacy could be overcome by proof of
the husband's sterility and today the presumption is more easily con-
troverted than in earlier times. Today it is generally recognized by
the courts that a child is illegitimate though born or begotten during
marriage, when access of the husband at the time of the conception
was impossible.25
As pointed out previously, it is probable that if a child should learn
that he is a "test-tube" baby, an undesirable psychological trauma
would develop, and for this reason it seems highly desirable as a
matter of policy, that the wife be precluded from showing in evidence
that her child was conceived through artificial insemination.
26
The role of the courts in this controversy is critical; the future of
40,000 families rests upon the sagacity and perspicacity of the courts.
It must be remembered that if the courts rule that artificial insemina-
tion by the donor method is illegal, 40,000 children will be declared
illegitimate, 40,000 mothers will be deemed adulterous, and will
subsequently afford grounds for 40,000 potential divorce cases.
INHERITANCE
Whether a child conceived by heterologous artificial insemination
is legitimate or illegitimate is an important question in respect to
rights of inheritance. At common law, an illegitimate child has no
inheritable blood and cannot inherit.2 7 But the legislature has power
to confer on illegitimate children the right to inherit, and there are
statutes in most jurisdictions conferring this right in varying de-
grees.
28
In accordance with the general common law rule, an illegitimate
child cannot take as an heir or distributee of the natural father,
29
but the statutes of most jurisdictions in the United States now recog-
nize the right of an illegitimate child to inherit from his mother.30
Therefore, if it is decided that an AID child is illegitimate and the
husband fails to adopt it legally, the child cannot inherit from the
husband. 3 '
24. State v. Schumpert, 1 S.C. 85 (1869); Barr's Next of Kin et al. v.
Ch-rokee, Inc., et al., 220 S.C. 447, 68 S.E. 2d 440 (1951).
25. Ibid.; 10 C. J. S. 20.
26. See note 8 supra, p. 159.
27. Barwick v. Miller. 4 Desaus. Eq. 434 (S.C. 1814).
28. CnDE OF LAWS Or SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 19-53.
29. Gibson v. Rikard, 143 S.C. 402, 141 S.E. 726 (1928).
30. See note 28 supra; Trout v. Burnett, 99 S.C. 276, 83 S.E. 684 (1914);
Rhodes v. Williams, 143 Ga. 342, 85 S.E. 105 (1915); Hardesty v. Mitchell,
302 Ill. 369, 134 N.E. 745 (1922) ; Hastings v. Rathbone, 194 Iowa 177, 188
N.W. 960 (1922).
31. See note 25 supra, p. 1832.
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Some observers advise that all questions as to the legitimacy of a
child conceived by heterologous artificial insemination should be ig-
nored and reliance should be placed upon the secrecy attendant on
artificial insemination and on the presumption that a child born dur-
ing wedlock is legitimate.
In most cases of artificial insemination, the circumstances may
never be known to anyone other than the husband, wife, and attend-
ing physician. However, contests challenging the right and capacity
of a child conceived by artificial insemination to inherit property from
the husband of the mother may arise. Legislation should be enacted
to permit the introduction of evidence to show the intestate's action
during his life in order to prove that he desired the estate to go to the
child and not to interested relatives.82 If the mother and her husband
executed wills, the child could be protected without relying upon the
courts or legislature to decide the question.
HUSBAND'S RicGIT TO CUSTODY
Generally, the natural parent of a minor illegitimate child is entitled
to the custody of the child and it is the duty of the court to award
the custody to the natural parent unless it is clearly evident that such
parent is unfit or incompetent to take charge of the child. However,
the paramount consideration in determining to whom the custody of
a child shall be awarded after divorce or during separation is the
welfare and best interest of the child.88
In the case of Strnad v. Strnad,8 4 which involved the custody of a
child conceived by heterologous artificial insemination, the court held
that the husband was entitled to visitation rights, which were not
precluded by the fact that he was not the child's biological father. The
court concluded that the child had been semi-adopted by the defen-
dant husband. At any rate, the husband, with particular reference to
visitation, is entitled to the same rights and obligations as those ac-
quired by a foster parent who has formally adopted a child, if not the
same rights as those to which a natural parent would be entitled.35
"Upon the authority of the Strnad case it would appear that in a
closely analogous case of a custody proceeding, the court would hold
that the husband would have the same rights as those acquired by a
foster parent who has formally adopted a child." 36
32. Koerner, supra note 1, at 503.
33. 27 C. J. S. 309; 17 Am. J. 683.
34. See note 20 supra.
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LEGIsLATION
As previously stated, there has been no satisfactory settlement of
AID and its ramifications. The different problems that may eventu-
ally arise should be ominous to all parties concerned with this radical
method of procreation.
Some of the precautions advised for doctors in this field are that
fingerprints and written consents of the recipient and her husband
be preserved, together with photographs of the husband. In the
event that the sterile husband brought a suit for divorce or insti-
tuted a proceeding to annul the marriage, he would be estopped by
this written consent showing that he had agreed to have his wife
artificially impregnated.
37
The donor must be protected against blackmail and other involve-
ments. The identity of the donor should be absolutely concealed from
the recipient donee, and that of the recipient donee from the donor.
Some of the precautions suggested to insure this are that the sperm
be delivered to the doctor at a time other than when the patient is
present and that the donor be admitted through a back entrance which
is not used by the patients. Another precaution advised is that the
donor be a married man and that both his and his wife's consent be
obtained in writing, properly acknowledged before a notary.
38
Even though every possible precaution is considered and taken,
every party concerned with artificial insemination remains in a dubi-
ous position until some concrete and satisfactory solution to the prob-
lem has been reached.
It should be remembered that should heterologous artificial insemi-
nation be declared adulterous, the above mentioned consents would be
of no value.3 9 There are still too many people who would regard ar-
tificial insemination as contrary to good morals and against the best
interests of the community, and a court might find a contract to per-
form an artificial insemination void as against public policy. In any
event, public opinion will exert considerable gravitational influence
upon the final resolution of the question. The courts have an increas-
ingly important problem before them and comprehensive decisions are
necessary.
Artificial insemination insofar as its practice with human beings
is concerned, apparently has no established legal status. Research,
at any rate, has not disclosed a statute specifically dealing with the
matter. To date, there have been only six state legislatures which
37. Koerner, Medicolegal Considerations in Artificial Insemination, 8 LA.
L. R-v. 494 (1948).
38. Id., at 497.
39. Id., at 498.
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have considered bills on artificial insemination, but none has enacted
them.
40
Some considerations which should weigh in any possible legislation
would include the following:
The interest of the child should require prime consideration. Even
if the legality of AID is established, the rights of the child regard-
ing inheritance from the husband and the donor still require legisla-
tion. Legislation will be required concerning the inheritance of the
child from the husband of the mother. This will insure to the child
the legal capacity to take.
41
Then there is the problem of the child's inheritance rights from
the donor, who is the biological father. Adoption procedure in such
an instance is out of the question. A large number of courts will
probably not declare the offspring capable of inheritance from the bio-
logical father, since from a practical standpoint it would seem best
that no rights of inheritance flow from the donor to the child. Yet,
there are a few jurisdictions which recognize the right of illegitimates
generally.42
The husband may deny responsibility for the child. Argument is
made that the maintenance of records proves that the child is the pro-
duct of AID and not adultery, and that the husband consented and,
therefore, has the rights and duties of a parent.43 But if the courts
establish that AID is illegal, it may be reasoned that AID is adulter-
ous and all consents are void, giving the husband a legal denial.44
AID involves introduction into the wife's body of the seed of a
man other than her husband. Should the courts declare this legal,
then by analogy it may be argued that the courts would condone in-
troduction of the seed of a man other than her husband whether it
involved artificial insemination or any other method of deposition of
the seed. With the practice of AID on a large scale, a single donor
may father a large number of children and the chance of their mating
incestuously would be increased.
These legal problems and the many others which have been sug-
gested from time to time show the need for legislation to govern a
practice which, whatever the objections to it, seems bound to become
socially important. The greatest complexities of the issue are yet to
come and they obviously will create, increasingly, the need for legis-
lation.
40. Indiana, Minnesota, Virginia, Ohio, New York and Wisconsin.
41. See note 39 supra. Koerner, mepra, note 1, at 498.
42. Koerner, supra, note 1, at 501.
43. 28 Ind. L. J. 639 (1953).
44. Koerner, supra, note 1, at 498.
1957]
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There are some dangerous and doubtful factors referred to in the
British Medical Journal:
(1) The law governing the registration of births-if the hus-
band is registered as the father, there is an infringement
of the Perjury Act, 1911, which may subject the husband
and the advising and abetting physician to fine or penal ser-
vitude, -if the father's name is not stated, the child's
illegitimacy is patent to everyone who sees the certificate;
(2) If there is a will or a settlement creating an interest in
property in favor of the 'heirs of the body' of the couple,
they may be faced with the alternative of disclosing the
child's illegitimacy or of committing a fraud upon the per-
son who would benefit- in the absence of legitimate off-
spring. In the latter event, the physician who brought about
the conception might find himself involved in the subse-
quent proceeding . . . . ; and despite the use of a consent
form, either the husband or the wife may deny having given
a real consent. If the degree of consent is brought into




The conclusion to this discussion is best voiced by these views
appearing in the Journal of the American Medical Association:
The paucity of law relating to the procedure suggests that the
public has given little serious consideration to its many implica-
tions. There are legal, social, and moral questions associated
with the use of the procedure that have not been resolved. The
rights of husbands, wives, children, donors and physicians are
not clear. The obligations and liabilities of all who participate
in or who are affected by artificial insemination procedures are
subject to conjecture and doubt. Medicine has made a scien-
tific procedure available to society, but until the people indi-
vidually and collectively determine and express public policy, in
the form of legislation or otherwise, the uncertainties associated
with the procedure will remain.
46
Artificial insemination strikes so strongly against the mores, folk-
ways and institutions of our culture that legislation regarding this
45. British Medical Journal, May 3, 1947, p. 606.
46. 157 J. Amer. Med. Ass'n. 1616 (1955).
[Vol. 9
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matter would be extremely difficult to enact. But the fact remains
that the practice is rather widespread and the legal problems raised
cannot be swept aside by ignoring them. It's none too early for the
legal profession, bench and bar alike, to be giving serious thought to
the implications of a practice which involves directly several thousand
additional people each year. The fact that the insemination took place
in one jurisdiction is no assurance that the legal problems raised will
not require resolution in a different jurisdiction. It seems that the
practices and procedures of artificial insemination will be determined
by a combination of society's concepts and those extant laws dealing
with the implied and the inherent legal relationships.
BETTy Jo EDMNS.
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